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ABSTRACT. Traditional maintenance contracts using the unit price system and prescriptive 
specifications are simple in their structure and implementation. Implementation of prescrip-
tive-based specification reduces though the flexibility of the procurement and limits the pos-
sibilities of the contractor to improve the in-sight operation. Furthermore, the management 
of the contract faces difficulties such as poor performance of the buildings and ineffective 
contract management. Performance-Based-Maintenance (PBM) attains an alternative means 
for outsourcing of maintenance. The objective of the study was to comparatively assess the 
state-of-the-art of PBM between the Netherlands and Israel, with the focus on performance of 
public facilities and cost of the service. Pilot studies, carried out in the Netherlands and Israel, 
reveal that PBM attains high potential of cost-savings (20%) and improved performance. The 
paper concludes with provision of a future bidding system for PBM contracts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional maintenance contracts using the 
unit price system and prescriptive specifica-
tions are simple in their structure and im-
plementation. Nevertheless the management 
of the contract faces difficulties such as poor 
performance of the buildings (Stenbeck, 2008). 
PBM offers an outline for systematic transfer 
of facilities between different contracts as well 
as a platform for management of the contract, 
and the elimination of change-orders. The 
performance concept in construction implies 
that the demands of the buildings are speci-
fied according to the outcomes of the process 
rather than according to prescribed detail of 
activities. This concept of specification allows 
concentrating in the outcomes and leaves flex-
ibility for the contractor and the designer of 
the service/activity.
PBM Contracts are based on the following 
principles: (a) performance model; (b) preven-
tive maintenance and rehabilitation model; 
(c) Pricing model; and (d) Risk sharing mod-
el (Cheng and Leu, 2008; Damnjanovic and 
Zhang, 2008; Lugtigheid et al., 2007). Four 
parameters are identified as the core drivers 
for PBM (Shohet, 2006): (a) Expectations to 
develop effective procurement methods; (b) 
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200 I. M. Shohet and A. Straub
to meet the end-user needs; (c) Establishment 
of an effective tendering system composed of 
core criteria for pre-qualification of contrac-
tors and of bid-winning criteria that will en-
sure the quality of the services provided, and 
(d) Establishment of a decisive mechanism for 
transferring the facility from former to succes-
sor contractor.
2. DUTCH HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
Dutch housing associations have a market 
share of about 33% of the entire Dutch hous-
ing stock. Relatively speaking, it is the larg-
est social rented sector in the European Union 
and maybe in the world. Over 400 Dutch social 
landlords own more than 2.4 million dwell-
ing units, and have a total annual turnover 
of around 13.5 billion Euros. Together, Dutch 
housing associations spend over 4 billion Euros 
annually on maintenance and improvement of 
dwellings. External suppliers of maintenance 
and improvement services account for approxi-
mately 90% of the annual turnover.
In the Netherlands, the Housing Act of 1901 
provides the public framework for housing as-
sociations’ activities. These social enterprises 
fulfil a public function combined with what are 
more or less commercial activities. During the 
1990s Dutch housing associations were trans-
formed into so-called hybrid organisations, 
“combining task organization (implementing 
public tasks) and market organization (meet-
ing market demands)” (Priemus, 2001: 247). 
Both their market and task operations forced 
housing associations to adopt a more struc-
tured approach to measuring and monitoring 
their performance. The drive towards more 
professional standards led to the adaptation 
of private sector approaches to public housing 
management (Nieboer and Gruis, 2004).
The professionalism of Dutch housing as-
sociations has led to paying more attention 
to maintenance and partnerships in the sup-
ply chain of maintenance, leading to PBM 
contracts too. Technical construction legisla-
tion sets only the lower limits for the housing 
quality level. In any case, all dwellings have to 
satisfy the minimal requirement of the Dutch 
Building Decree. The housing associations are 
permitted to use long term PBM contracts, be-
cause European legislation for public tender-
ing is not mandatory for them. 
For public facilities new legislation for envi-
ronmental public procurement has been put in 
operation in 2010. This legislation gives pref-
erence to performance-based procurement of 
the maintenance of facilities. 
2.1. Performance-Based–Maintenance 
(PBM)
Generally, the objectives of housing associa-
tions in the implementation of PBM contract-
ing are (Straub, 2007):
 – achieving budget certainty and cost sav-
ings;
 – improving product quality;
 – simplifying the maintenance manage-
ment process; and
 – promoting innovation by maintenance 
contractors. 
Maintenance contractors emphasise perfor-
mance, time, and cost improvements by hav-
ing continuity in ordering, and a better under-
standing of the needs of housing associations 
by PBM. Long term partnering for periods of 
4–8 years provide the possibility of balancing 
exterior summer activities with interior winter 
activities, providing contractors with levelled 
maintenance resources throughout the year. 
This allows the contractor to employ its work-
ers full-time, enabling them to plan and invest 
in training and continuous development. More-
over, long term contracts reduce significantly 
the overhead costs of managing the contract.
Continuity enables maintenance services to 
be offered at the best level of quality, under-
standing the performance needs of housing as-
sociations, monitoring degradation, and mak-
ing use of Life Cycle Costing (LCC) and total 
costs of ownership principles.
PBM contracts applied by Dutch housing 
associations are based on minimal perfor-
mance criteria of building components de-
fined by the client. So-called ‘decisive perfor-
mance requirements’ are directly linked to 
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the clients performance needs and a building 
component’s specific performance. The perfor-
mance criteria of building components, espe-
cially performance loss, are determined by as-
sessing defects through visual inspections. A 
minimum percentage of measurements, taken 
randomly, should meet the criteria (Straub, 
2007). Validation that the actual performance 
addresses the required performance by the 
clients is carried out by ongoing performance 
measurements by the contractor and through 
tenants surveys regarding the success of the 
actual performance of the facility to meet the 
required performance.
Within performance-based relationships, 
the selection of maintenance contractors is 
very important for the owner. Parties getting 
in the relationship should have similar views 
and should approach the relationship with 
similar perspectives. All members of the as-
sociation of the Dutch medium-sized building 
maintenance employers ‘vastgoed onderhouds-
bedrijven (WVB)’ have adopted the EFQM (Eu-
ropean Foundation for Quality Management) 
Excellence Model. The fact that the contrac-
tor has to act as a maintenance-engineering 
consultant to the owner is vital for the PBM 
approach. The consultancy activities conducted 
by maintenance contractors for housing asso-
ciations include: providing advice on mainte-
nance strategies and design of maintenance 
scenarios, specifying maintenance activities, 
executing periodic performance measurements, 
and conducting tenants satisfaction surveys. 
Maintenance contractors can be certi-
fied to work according to PBM methods and 
procedures by the quality mark for real es-
tate PBM ‘VastGoedOnderhoud Keur’ (VGO 
KEUR) (Straub and Van Mossel, 2007; SCTV, 
2005). The VGO KEUR includes a wide range 
of requirements: financial standards, and con-
tractor’s performance outcome. A drawback 
is that PBM competencies of contractors are 
only demonstrated by a well-documented pro-
cess. Moreover the competencies scan primar-
ily measures resources. Conversely, owner’s 
satisfaction in maintenance-engineering con-
sultancy is heavily determined by capabilities, 
such as communication and empathy skills. 
Together with the integrity of the consultant, 
these seem to be the most important strategic 
capabilities of consultants from the viewpoint 
of the owner. Owners’ satisfaction is deter-
mined by contractors’ performance outcomes. 
Housing associations that use PBM con-
tracts acknowledge the importance of an in-
telligent client role (Straub, 2007: 139): “They 
need maintenance process managers with a 
thorough knowledge of functional needs, per-
formance, procurement, legal issues, and ac-
cess to high-level technical expertise (even if 
this has to be brought in from elsewhere).”
2.2. Method of the study
A quantitative model was developed that cal-
culates the Net Present Value of the direct 
(product) and indirect (transaction) costs for 
a competitive maintenance tendering and for 
PBM contracts. Direct costs represent the 
product costs for maintenance. For the owner, 
actual payments to the contractor represent 
the product costs: the contract price. Indirect 
costs are the transaction costs by the owner 
and the contractor in connection with the pro-
curement process (Table 1). Overall costs for 
the owner include the contract price and his 
own transaction costs. 
Table 1. Classification of maintenance direct and 
indirect costs
Direct costs Indirect costs














Non-project specific costs are relationship-
specific asset and overhead costs of contractors. 
Relationship-specific assets have little value 
outside a particular relationship of an owner 
and a maintenance contractor. However, the 
costs of these assets are not-project specific 
but relationship-specific. In practice most con-
202 I. M. Shohet and A. Straub
tractors will be hired for several projects of an 
owner. Examples for relationship-specific asset 
costs are a performance measurement method 
of the contractor adapted to the needs of the 
owner and general agreements of owners and 
contractors. Relationship-specific asset costs 
and overhead costs were not implemented in 
the study.
The model used in a pilot study was evalu-
ated with employees of maintenance contrac-
tors and housing associations. The adapted 
model links the maintenance scenario and di-
rect costs calculation to the indirect costs cal-
culation and is more user-friendly. This model 
includes project specific data, data about the 
maintenance scenarios (competitive and per-
formance-based) and contract prices, and data 
about the indirect costs and the planning of fu-
ture maintenance cycles. The initial process – 
the first maintenance cycle – and the subse-
quent processes consist of all activities con-
ducted during a maintenance cycle. Following 
the initial maintenance process, one or more 
subsequent processes will take place. It is as-
sumed that these subsequent processes will be 
equal in scope and transaction costs, although 
the actual maintenance activities and product 
cost undertaken in each can vary. The competi-
tive maintenance scenario exists of equal re-
curring product costs every maintenance cycle. 
Table 2. Classification model for Indirect costs: time sheet for project time of the initial maintenance 
process
Competitive Performance-based
Owner Contractor Owner Contractor
Specification
1. Inspection N/A N/A N/A
2. Formulating technical specifications N/A N/A N/A
3. Formulating functional and performance criteria N/A N/A N/A
Selection
4. Selection of contractors N/A N/A
Contracting
5. Collecting or adjusting project information





9. Collecting external advice
10. Inviting tenders and assessment subcontractors N/A N/A
11. Designing or adjusting maintenance scenario’s N/A N/A N/A
12. Formulating or adjusting offer
13. Assessment offers N/A N/A
14. Consultation about offers
15. Working out and consultation about activity plans
16. Commissioning and confirmation work




20. Project delivery and Final acceptation inspection
21. Project process evaluation
22. Tenants satisfaction evaluation
After-care
23. Performance measurements
24. Consultation performance measurements
25. Settle performance guarantees
N/A = not applicable
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The developed indirect costs model involves 
transactions costs of the owner and the con-
tractor. We term the costs related to the first 
state of the commercial process: “marketing 
contractor relation-specific transaction costs” 
or “overhead costs”. In the long term PBM re-
lationships contractors’ involvements enclose 
a part of the whole service life of a building. 
Indirect costs depend on the process activities 
that must be conducted by the owner and the 
contractor respectively throughout the main-
tenance period of the complex. Costs for pro-
viding advice about maintenance solutions and 
for conducting performance measurement are 
considered part of the bid costs or priced sepa-
rately.
The indirect costs model distinguishes 25 
process activities based upon the competi-
tive maintenance process and the PBM pro-
cess. The activities in the initial and subse-
quent processes are clustered into five phases: 
(1) specification, (2) selection, (3) contracting, 
(4) preparation, supervision and evaluation, 
and (5) after-care. The activities within the 
preparation phase, supervision and evalua-
tion do not involve the maintenance produc-
tion itself.
Table 2 shows a simplified example of a 
time sheet of the indirect costs model. In each 
column the owner and the contractor has to 
fill in the hours spent on the activity. Labour 
costs are calculated depending on the wage 
scale. Costs are based on a differentiation in 
hourly rates per activity, with the rates level 
depending on wage categories applied by both 
the owner and the contractor. The model as-
sumes that each party will have three such 
categories. Third parties, such as consultants 
or inspection agencies, may perform some ac-
tivities; the costs involved being charged to the 
owner and/or contractor.
The study included 22 projects, each pro-
ject involves exterior maintenance of housing 
estates owned and managed by a housing asso-
ciation. The projects are owned and managed 
by 13 different housing associations and main-
tained by 9 different contractors.
One of the projects is a residential build-
ing complex ‘Eksterstraat’ in Amersfoort. This 
complex exists of 104 single-family dwelling 
units, built in 1967. Maintenance activities 
are some replacements of windows, preventive 
wood work and repairs, and paintwork for a 
period of 30 years. The calculated direct costs 
in case of the PBM contracting are 13% lower 
compared to the (theoretical) situation if the 
work was tendered competitively. The main 
reason is that a well-considered maintenance 
interval extension from 6 to 7 years. The in-
direct costs of the PBM contracting approach 
drop with more than 50%, mainly in the subse-
quent processes (maintenance intervals).
2.3. Findings
From the results, the overall project costs for 
all kind of projects appear to be 20% lower for 
PBM than for competitive maintenance ten-
dering. In all projects the direct costs (contract 
price minus the indirect costs of the contrac-
tor) of PBM are lower, or at worst the same, 
as for competitive maintenance tendering. The 
share of the indirect costs of the owner in the 
overall project costs for both tendering ap-
proaches is small (2–5%). The costs savings on 
contract prices by PBM are the biggest for ‘to-
tal maintenance projects’, followed by ‘simple 
projects’ (Figure 1). 100% in the figures refers 
to competitive maintenance tendering.
Indirect costs of the owner are lower in 
case of PBM in the initial process as well as 
in subsequent processes. On average in PBM 














Bid price Indirect owner costs 
Figure 1. Average overall owner costs
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Figure 2. Average indirect costs of initial 
processes and of subsequent processes
 
 




Initial processes Subsequent Processes 
PBM reduces both Direct and Indirect 
costs. The essential preconditions are long 
term involvement and freedom in the main-
tenance design and process for the contractor, 
giving opportunities for product and main-
tenance process improvements. The process 
phases ‘specification’, ‘selection’, ‘contracting’ 
and ‘work and supervision’ become markedly 
less costly in case of PBM. The ‘after-care’ 
phase is markedly more expensive tendering 
performance-based, because of conducting pe-
riodic performance measurements. 
Product quality
The reduction of the product costs indicated 
that the product quality has been improved, 
e.g. cycles of maintenance activities could be 
extended. A broad-scale inventory of product 
quality improvement by PBM in the Nether-
lands is lacking. Output measurements, e.g. 
the technical performance of the maintained 
building components, are also not implement-
ed yet in the quality mark VGO-KEUR.
In 2006 a standard for condition assess-
ment of buildings has been introduced in the 
Netherlands (Straub, 2009a; Straub, 2009b). 
Based upon assessment of defects, and defect 
parameters importance, intensity, and extent, 
the condition of a building component is rated 
on a six-point rating scale. The third part of 
the standard will involve an aggregation of 
condition scores to a technical index of prin-
cipal systems and the whole building, using a 
ten-point rating scale. Replacement costs are 
being used to weigh the building components. 
This new index provides an opportunity to 
benchmark building properties and to validate 
the effectiveness of PBM compared to prescrip-
tive unit-price competitive bid procurement.
3. THE ISRAELI PUBLIC FACILITIES 
MAINTENANCE SECTOR
Israel’s built public facilities may be clas-
sified into hospitals (2.0 M. sq. m.), clinics 
(1.0 M. sq. m.), public offices, public buildings 
such as courthouses (0.3 M sq. m.), etc. Mainte-
nance services in most public organizations are 
contracted out through prescribed bill of quanti-
ties tenders in which the lowest bid is selected.
3.1. Performance-Based-Maintenance 
(PBM)
The Israeli standardization in maintenance 
of built facilities evolved in the past two dec-
ades from the British Standard BS 8210:1986 
(1986). It is based on preventive PBM of the 
mechanical systems and along condition-based 
maintenance of the structural, exterior enve-
lope, and interior finishes components of the 
building. The standard implies the appoint-
ment of a facility manager responsible for 
administering all necessary preventive and 
breakdown maintenance activities to main-
tain the building at a safe and sustainable 
condition. The standard does not indicate per-
formance levels by which the building perfor-
mance may be monitored; furthermore, it does 
not allow any consideration of the performance 
by the owner of the facility (Israel Standards 
Institution, 1999, 2002). As the buildings stock 
expanded in terms of complexity and perfor-
mance requirements, development of a PBM 
standard is expected.
PBM was designed along the following 
guidelines:
 – Given performance of the facilities at the 
beginning of the contract;
 – Commitment of the contractor to provide 
maintenance services so as to meet per-
formance at a predefined agreed level ac-
cording to the performance model, i.e. a 
minimum of BPI (Building Performance 
Indicators) > 80 as described below;
 – Preventive maintenance of the core 
building systems: Electricity and HVAC, 
is carried out with core maintenance 
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crew along the year, major prepara-
tory preventive maintenance activities 
are scheduled towards the winter and 
summer: these activities are carried out 
with the aid of additional supporting 
staff allocated by the contractor as back-
up crews for peak-maintenance periods. 
This guideline allows the contractor to 
carry the majority of maintenance activi-
ties with core resource levelled body of 
manpower.
Owner/clients that implement PBM are 
capable of: (1) strategic policy making (long 
term objectives for the building stock and the 
performance), (2) established requirements of 
performance, and (3) high inspection capabili-
ties (Shohet, 2006).
3.2. Method of the study
The study was designed to follow 5-steps as 
follows: 
A – Benchmarking of the performance of the 
facilities under competitive prescribed specifi-
cation and unit-price contract;
B – Development of performance specification 
and PBM Contract;
C – Setting outlines for PBM lump-sum ten-
dering: definition of prequalification require-
ments, establishment of transfer mechanism 
of the facility, and definition of payments and 
monitoring milestones;
D – Implementation of PBM on a sample of 6 
public facilities; 
E – Comparison of performance and cost ef-
fectiveness of the maintenance of the facilities 
between years 2007 and 2008 according to 3 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).
Building Performance Indicator (BPI)
This KPI is adapted here for public facilities; it 
monitors the physical state and fitness for use 
of the building and of the systems in it. The 
rationale behind this indicator is the need for 
a Life Cycle Cost-weighted score, scaled from 
0 to 100, to each of the principal building sys-
tems, expressing its physical and functional 
(performance) states. In all, 9 principal sys-
tems were defined in public office buildings. 
Each building system’s score, defined as Pk, re-
flects three composites: its physical state, typi-
cal failures and their frequency of occurrence, 
and the maintenance policy. The combination 
of the aforementioned composites represents 
the performance level of the system (Pk). The 
weighting of a building system (Wk) is obtained 
from cost shares of that system’s components 
based on the Life Cycle Costs including instal-
lation, maintenance and replacement. The BPI 
is then calculated by multiplying of weights for 




BPI P Wk kk
 (1)
BPI can be analyzed as follows:
 – BPI > 80 indicates good state of the per-
formance of the building or better;
 – 70 < BPI ≤ 80 expresses satisfactory (80) 
or marginal (70) condition;
 – 60 < BPI ≤ 70 reflects deterioration of the 
building; and
 – BPI ≤ 60 means that the building is run-
down.
Normalized Annual Maintenance Expenditure 
(NAME)
This KPI is introduced to neutralise the An-
nual Maintenance Expenditure (AME) from 
the effects of Age and Occupancy on the main-









where: the AMEy is the Annual Maintenance 
Expenditure in ($/sq.m.); ACy is the Age Coef-
ficient for year y, and OCy is the Occupancy 
Coefficient (Shohet et al., 2003). These coeffi-
cients adjust the AME to prevailing occupancy 
condition and age of the building.
Maintenance Efficiency Indicator (MEIy)
This KPI examines the maintenance efficiency 
with inputs such as BPI and NAMEy as ex-









where: the MEIy is the Maintenance Efficiency 
Indicator for year y; ipy is the trades and office 
buildings construction prices index published 
by the National Bureau of Statistics (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2012), and NAMEy is the 
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Normalized Annual Maintenance Expenditure 
for year y according to expression (2) above. 
MEIy may vary between 0 and values above it. 
For a typical office building with reinstate-
ment value of US$1,180, annual maintenance 
costs of US$30 and expected performance of 
BPI=100, standard occupancy and Age Coef-
ficient of 1.0, this indicator yields the value of 
0.30. 
MEIy for public buildings is inferred as fol-
lows:
 – MEIy < 0.24 represents a state in which 
either the budgetary investment is low or 
the efficiency of the utilization of mainte-
nance resources is high, or both;
 – 0.24 ≤ MEIy ≤ 0.36 represents the desir-
able situation of maintenance with sound 
correlation between the maintenance re-
sources and the actual performance;
 – MEIy > 0.36 indicates high inputs rela-
tive to the actual performance. This may 
express either high expenditure or low 
physical performance or a combination 
of both situations.
The threshold values of 0.24 and 0.36 were 
defined according to the standard deviation 
of the normative value of 0.30 for office and 
public facilities. The threshold values express 
a solid variance of 0.20 i.e. the coefficient of 
variance is 0.20.
3.3. Profile of the public facilities sample 
in Israel
A two-year study was carried out in six pub-
lic facilities owned by the government, serving 
civil servants and public, and maintained by 
a contractor that is selected based on quality 
(30%) and price (70%). The Total floor area of 
the buildings is 37,200 sq. m., indicating an 
average floor area of 6,206 sq. m. The mean 
age of the buildings is 35 years, and the mean 
occupancy is 117 visitors per sq. m./year, indi-
cating relatively low occupancy compared with 
standard occupancy of 175 visitors per sq. m./
year.
3.4. Findings
A preliminary field survey of the performance 
of the facilities was carried out in 2007, during 
this year the maintenance of the facilities was 
carried out based on a conventional prescribed 
specification and unit-price competitive bid. In 
the end of 2007 a PBM lump-sum contract was 
developed and in 2008, the maintenance of the 
facilities was carried out along the outline of 
PBM. The performance and effectiveness of 
the sample of the facilities was reassessed in 
the end of 2008 and compared with those of 
year 2007.
Performance of the facilities according to 
the BPI improved in average from 73.6 to 79.8 
by the end of 2008. This improvement was 
consistent in all the facilities in the sample. 
The average Normalized Annual Expenditure 
(NAME) was reduced by more than 20% and 
the Maintenance Efficiency indicator depicted 
an improvement in efficiency by 20% as well 
(from 0.42 to 0.33). Comparison of the BPI vs. 
the NAME explores that after one year of PBM 
lump-sum procurement the facilities sample 
is found in a consistently higher performance 
and within the boundaries of the normative 
range of efficiency (MEI = 0.33). This may be 
virtually seen in Figure 4 as in 2008 5 out 
of the 6 facilities are found in the normative 
range of 0.24 ≤ MEI ≤ 0.36, while in 2007 only 
2 of the facilities were found in the normative 
range (Figure 3). This case demonstrates a 
cost savings potential of implementing PBM 
of 20%. The cost savings in this example were 
achieved by the following amendments: (1) 
reduced number of core personnel that have 
become possible thanks to the concise periodic 
activities at two peak periods (toward winter 
and summer); (2) extension of the replacement 
Figure 3. BPI Vs. NAME for the public facilities 
sample 2007
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periods in some components, such as roofing, 
and exterior claddings; (3) reduced stock of 
spare parts (for plumbing, electricity, and 
interior finishing); and (4) reduced direct in-
spection costs, as inspection was concentrated 
in performance rather than in resources and 
execution.
4. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE 
STUDIES
A comparative study of PBM pilot projects car-
ried out in the Netherlands and in Israel was 
carried out in 2009, with reference to years 
2008 and 2007. Review of the maintenance 
sectors in both countries depicts that PBM 
contracting in the Facilities Management (FM) 
sector stem from the performance concept in 
construction. It is being implemented only in 
the maintenance public sector.
Table 3 comparatively summarizes key fac-
tors in PBM contracting as deduced from the 
outlines and outcomes of both studies: Pro-
curement model, Contractors’ services, Main-
tenance Management, Performance Manage-
ment, Total costs and Performance outcomes. 
The comparison between PBM contracting key 
factors depicts that a bid on a combination be-
tween quality and price was adopted in both 
studies; the assessment of quality was carried 
out based on engineering consultancy capabili-
ties, the assessment of the professional profile 
of previous projects, and body of technical staff 
(Quality and Availability). In the Netherlands 
as well as in Israel the contractors are asked 
for engineering-consultancy services next to 
the execution of maintenance activities. Plan-
ning of maintenance activities was carried out 
in Israel according to seasonal guidelines as a 
means for maintenance resource levelling. In 
the Netherlands the planning of maintenance 
activities is based upon performance measure-
ments by the contractor; the planning covers 
preventive maintenance activities as well as 
repairs and replacements of components. Vali-
dation that the actual performance addresses 
the required performance by the clients is car-
ried out by on-going performance measure-
ments by the contractor and through tenant 
Table 3. Comparison between key factors of PBM contracting between the Netherlands and Israel
Key factors The Netherlands Israel
Procurement model Performance specifications, Unit prices, 
PBM qualifications (VGO-KEUR) 
Performance specifications,
Lump sum, Quality-price bid, 
PBM qualifications, 
Contractors’ services Engineering-consultancy Engineering-consultancy




Performance management Performance criteria building 
components, preliminary condition 
survey, on-going performance 
measurements, tenant surveys
KPIs: BPI, NAME, MEI, 
Preliminary survey, on-going 
surveys
Total costs –20% –20%
Performance outcomes Not assessed +5%
Figure 4. BPI Vs. NAME for the public facilities 
sample 2008
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surveys regarding the success of the actual 
performance of the facility to meet the re-
quired performance. 
Comparison of the costs savings between 
the studies depicts that 20% reduction in costs 
was found in both studies, this reduction is at-
tributed to reduction in direct costs and in indi-
rect costs such as transactions and non project 
relationship specific asset costs such as consul-
tancies. In the Netherlands the performance 
outcome were not assessed. The contractors 
take responsibilities and risks for longer term 
performance of the components. One may ex-
pect that the PBM performance is higher. The 
maintenance performance was monitored and 
compared in the Israeli study: an improvement 
of more than 5% was inspected according to 
the BPI (from 73.6 to 79.8). 
5. DISCUSSION
The study investigates the capability of PBM 
Contracts for outsourcing of Maintenance in 
public Facilities; The principles of PBM were 
briefly outlined: these principles include: tech-
nical prequalification of the contractors, per-
formance scales for buildings systems mainte-
nance performance monitoring, performance 
specification of maintenance, establishment of 
payment and performance monitoring mecha-
nisms, and risk sharing model. These princi-
ples were implemented in pilot studies in the 
Netherlands and in Israel. Key factors of PBM 
were identified as: Bid on quality and price, 
requirement of consultancy qualifications on 
the contractor side, planning of maintenance 
activities according to seasonal guidelines as a 
means to provide the contractor with efficient 
resource levelling.
The findings reported from both pilot stud-
ies depict an improved performance following 
the implementation of PBM in the facilities. 
The efficiency with which the resources were 
used was found to be 20% better in both stud-
ies. This improved performance is attributed 
to the following principle drivers:
a) PBM provided decisive criteria for moni-
toring facilities performance, these criteria 
improved the quality control (contractor) in 
the Dutch study and the quality assurance 
process (owner) in both studies;
b) Pre-Qualification requirements focused 
in technical capabilities of the contractor 
stimulated the development of consultancy 
capabilities of the contractors, these Pre 
Qualifications (PQ) improved the quality 
and efficiency of the operations and con-
tributed to reduced number of claims and 
disputes along the implementation of the 
contract;
c) As the contract is on a lump-sum basis, the 
management and administration of the con-
tract requires less bureaucracy in Israel. In 
the Dutch case the adoption of a lump-sum 
model is barred due to risk barriers on the 
contractors’ side;
d) The tendering system is developed so as to 
include a greater share of quality (30–70% 
of the total tender grade), this improved the 
effectiveness of the tendering process.
The latter conclusions foster the develop-
ment of FM and Maintenance standardizations 
that will stimulate the application of PBM ten-
dering by establishment of performance moni-
toring scales, and standard contract for PBM 
that will address the pre-qualification and ten-
dering issues.
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